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Scarzafava: An Analysis of Products Liability Defenses in the Aftermath of Ho

AN ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY DEFENSES IN
THE AFTERMATH OF HOPKINS
JOHN F. SCARZAFAVA*

The law of products liability is an outgrowth of the technological
revolution and the modern marketing practices of the twentieth
century. It is a field characterized by dynamism as opposed to precedent. Although once predicated upon warranty and negligence,
products liability is today in the throes of a transition from warranty
and negligence law to strict liability.' Nowhere can this transition
be more fully appreciated than in an analysis of the defenses applicable to the different theories of recovery.
Just as the field of products liability has undergone many stages
in its development, so too have its defenses been continually modified. Most courts have recognized defenses for an action based on
negligence which are different from those allowed in a strict liability
action. Other courts have failed to draw this distinction.2 Thus, in
this transitory stage, products liability actions continue to yield
inconsistent results. In an effort to resolve this conflict, the Supreme
Court of Texas recently addressed the scope of one of the defenses,
that of misuse, in General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins.3 In order to
* B.A., St. Bonaventure University; J.D., St. Mary's University; Associate, Gochman
& Weir, San Antonio, Texas.
1. Most products liability cases will be based upon negligence or strict liability because
a warranty approach generally does not lend itself to a case based upon personal injury. See
Hall v. Chrysler Corp., 526 F.2d 350, 352-53 (5th Cir. 1976)(plaintiff's recovery under strict
liability, but assembler entitled to recover from supplier of parts under warranty theory);
McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577, 583-84 (7th Cir. 1965)(recovery predicated on
warranty, but court stated that plaintiff could also have recovered under strict liability);
Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 36-37 (1973).
2. Compare Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975)(assumption of
risk distinguished from contributory negligence), and Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519
S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex. 1974)(assumption of risk distinguished from contributory negligence),
with Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1108 (5th Cir. 1973)(contributory
negligence equated with assumption of risk).
3. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). The Hopkins decision involved the misuse and modification of a carburetor on an automobile manufactured by General Motors Corporation. The
plaintiff had removed the General Motors carburetor and installed a carburetor made by
another manufacturer. After having some difficulty with the new carburetor, the plaintiff
later reinstalled the General Motors carburetor using a technique and parts not approved by
General Motors. The jury found the original product to be defective and found the defect to
be a producing cause of the injuries incurred. The jury also determined that the plaintiff had
misused the carburetor and automobile and held that this misuse was, likewise, a producing
cause. The trial court disregarded the jury findings relative to misuse and found in favor of
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structure its innovative position on misuse, 4 the court addressed
other related subjects clarifying the causation issue and questioning, in dictum, the viability of "state of the art" as a defense.5
Although the Hopkins decision certainly did not complete the transition to strict liability, and in fact, may have raised more questions
than it answered, it nevertheless established a definite framework
against which the other products liability defenses can be evaluated. In so doing, Hopkins has lent some valuable insight into the
evolving law of products liability. An examination of the applicable
defenses, as they presently exist in the aftermath of Hopkins, will
facilitate an understanding of the direction that products liability
law should take in the future.
SOME CONSIDERATIONS IN SELECTION OF PLEADINGS IN NEGLIGENCE OR
STRICT LIABILITY

When preparing a products liability case, the practitioner must
be cognizant of the legal theories available. Although there are three
approaches that may be utilized, in the majority of cases the practitioner will be concerned only with negligence and strict liability., In
theory, these approaches are separate and distinct; in practice, however, the distinctions are not as pronounced.7 Some have attributed
this discrepancy to the failure of the bench and bar to appreciate
fully the role of strict liability in a products liability case.' Whatever
the reason, the trial lawyer must recognize the distinctions in order
the plaintiff. The court of civil appeals affirmed, holding that misuse which is only a concurrent cause of an accident does not, by law, limit the plaintiffs recovery. General Motors Corp.
v. Hopkins, 535 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976), modified, 548
S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). The supreme court was thus faced with the question whether the
plaintiff should recover all, part, or none of his damages. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins,
548 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex. 1977).
4. The court created a pure comparative liability formula where unforeseeable misuse
had been shown to be a proximate cause of the damages incurred. General Motors Corp. v.
Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tex. 1977).
5. Id. at 350-51. The court also discussed "defective design" as it relates to jury charges
in a products liability case. Id. at 347 n.1.
6. Most products liability cases will be based upon negligence or strict liability because
a warranty approach generally does not lend itself to a case based upon personal injury. See
Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 36-37 (1973).
7. See Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 545 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1977, writ granted)(jury finding of proximate cause on negligence sufficient
to support producing cause element in strict liability without submission of special issue on
producing cause).
8. See Kronzer & Nichols, "No Duty" and "Volenti Non Fit Injuria"-Are the Ghosts
Really Laid?, 2 TEx. TRIAL LAw. F. 16 (1976).
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to prosecute his suit competently under the present law.
Under the strict liability doctrine, liability is not based on the
concept of fault. In the words of Dean Page Keeton, "[tihe plaintiff
is no longer required to impugn the maker, but he is required to
impugn the product." 9 In order to do this, the plaintiff must establish that the product in question was unreasonably dangerous as
marketed by the manufacturer.'" Strict liability has eliminated the
necessity of demonstrating the existence of the manufacturer's negligence and, in so doing, has discarded the concept of foreseeability." In spite of this more lenient burden of proof, the plaintiff's
attorney may, nonetheless, opt to plead in negligence or both in
negligence and in strict liability. He may thereby avoid a defense
available under one of these theories but not the other.
The present state of the law creates a unique situation in which
the conduct of the plaintiff, as opposed to that of the defendant,
may often dictate the theory which the plaintiff's lawyer will utilize.
For example, assumption of the risk is an absolute defense in strict
liability 2 but no defense at all in negligence. On the other hand,
contributory negligence 4 is at least a partial defense in suits based
upon negligence' 5 but no defense at all in strict liability.' Thus, in
cases in which the plaintiff arguably assumed the risk, 7 it would be
9. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 33 (1973);
accord, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1096 (1974); Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Tex. 1975); Crocker v. Winthrop
Laboratories, 514 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1974).
10. E.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1096 (1974); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 851 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex.
1977).
11. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977); Rourke v. Garza,
530 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Tex. 1975). But see Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 514 S.W.2d 429,
432-33 (Tex. 1974) (foreseeable abnormal reaction to drug); Davis v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505
S.W.2d 682, 691 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (foreseeable bystanders).
12. E.g., Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex. 1974); Shamrock Fuel
& Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 785 (Tex. 1967); Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520
S.W.2d 527, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
13. Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975).
14. Contributory negligence is used in the sense that the plaintiff's negligence was a
concurring proximate cause of the injury rather than the sense that such negligence would
completely bar recovery.
15. Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975); see TEX. REV. CiV. STAT.
ANN. art. 2212a, § 1 (Supp. 1976-1977) (Comparative Negligence Statute).
16. E.g., Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975); Henderson v. Ford Motor
Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex. 1974); Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex. 1974).
17. Assumption of the risk exists where, (1) the plaintiff voluntarily exposed himself to
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preferable to proceed in negligence so as to circumvent the absolute
defense of assumption of the risk. In suits in which the facts indicate
that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, however, the plaintiff's lawyer should proceed in strict liability, so that comparative
negligence would not reduce or bar recovery."
There are other considerations that the practitioner may wish to
consider in choosing a legal theory. One obvious consideration involves the amount of the jury verdict. Evidence designed to impugn
the manufacturer tends to result in higher jury verdicts than evidence which merely establishes a defective product. 9 For this reason, a plaintiff, with a strong strict liability case and a weaker
negligence case, may choose to proceed under both theories. In
doing so, however, the practitioner must be aware that he will be
required to refute the defensive issues applicable to both theories.
This can be done through the use of limiting instructions and separate jury issues on strict liability and negligence." In contrast, however, where a plaintiff's negligence case is stronger it still might be
preferable to proceed under both theories because of the lesser burden of proof in strict liability.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE VERSUS ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK

Contributory Negligence-A Remnant of Negligence Law?
Until such time as the transition from negligence to strict liability
is fully realized, contributory negligence will remain a viable dethe risk; (2) with knowledge and appreciation of the danger involved; (3) by a free and
intelligent choice. Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1975, no writ); see Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex. 1974);
Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255, 260 (Tex. 1974).
18. An example of contributory negligence that would not amount to assumption of the
risk could occur in a situation where a plaintiff negligently failed to discover the defect in a
product, failed to guard against the possibility of its existence, or failed to use the degree of
care which a prudent person would have used in handling the product. Henderson v. Ford
Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex. 1974)(failure to discover defect in product); General
Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 535 S.W.2d 880, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976),
modified on other grounds, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977)(failure to use degree of care which
prudent person would have used); see Helicoid Gage Div. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573, 575-77
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(failure to guard against possibility of existence of defect).
19. For example, in Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. the jury rendered a verdict in
excess of a quarter of a million dollars. Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Civ. No. 74-Cl9467, Dist. Ct. of Bexar County, 131st Judicial Dist. of Texas, May 12, 1976. Interviews with
members of the jury in that case indicate that the jury found it easier to focus on the concept
of fault. Interviews with jurors in other cases corroborate this finding.
20. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 273, 275, 277.
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fense in products liability cases predicated upon negligence." The
contributory negligence of the plaintiff is to be measured objectively. Thus the plaintiff is contributorily negligent when his conduct does not conform to that of the reasonable and prudent man.22
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines contributory negligence as negligence that consists of a failure to discover the defect
in the product or to guard against the possibility of the existence of
the defect. 3 Thus, simple carelessness on the part of a plaintiff is
sufficient to raise the defense of contributory negligence. The Texas
Comparative Negligence Act,24 effective September 1, 1973, governs
the defense of contributory negligence in this state. Prior to the
adoption of this statute, contributory negligence was a complete
defense. Now, under the comparative negligence statute, the negligence of the plaintiff will be compared with that of the defendant,
their respective damages assessed, and the liability apportioned."
Contributory negligence, under the statute, may nevertheless be a
total defense if the negligence of the plaintiff was a proximate cause
of more than fifty percent of his injury. Hence, at present, contributory, or more correctly, comparative negligence is at least a partial
bar to recovery in a case predicated upon negligence."8 Contributory
negligence is not, however, a defense in a case predicated upon strict
liability.2 7 "The fact that a consumer does not use a defective product . . . with the same degree of care as a prudent person will not
preclude his recovery under the theory of strict liability where the
product was defective when supplied. 21 8 This is true even where the
21. See Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975); Shamrock Fuel &
Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 406 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966), aff'd, 416
S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
22. Moody v. City of Galveston, 524 S.W.2d 583, 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1975, writ refd n.r.e.); W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 65, at 419 (4th ed. 1971).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, Comment n at 356 (1965). See also Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
24. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Supp. 1976-1977).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. E.g., Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975); Farley v. M M Cattle Co.,
529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518
S.W.2d 868, 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Feinberg, The Applicability of a ComparativeNegligence Defense in a Strict ProductsLiability Suit Based on Section
402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d (Can Oil and Water Mix?), 42 INS. COUNSEL J. 39, 42
(1975); Sales and Perdue, The Law of Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REV. 1, 6364 (1977).
28. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 535 S.W.2d 880, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1976), modified on other grounds, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
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improper conduct of the user follows a discovery of the defect. 9
Sometimes both scholars and practitioners tend to overlook contributory negligence as a defense in products liability cases. It
should be stressed, therefore, that so long as the negligence theory
is recognized in products liability cases, the defense of contributory
negligence will remain as critical as the other products liability
defenses .'
Assumption of the Risk-A Defense to Strict Liability
Assumption of the risk is an absolute defense in a strict liability
cause of action.3 1 It is not, however, a defense to a cause of action
based upon negligence. 3 Assumption of the risk presupposes that
one voluntarily encounters a danger of which he has knowledge and
appreciation.3 3 Thus, these distinct elements must be proven in
order for the defendant to assert the defense of assumption of the
risk.
Knowledge and Appreciation of the Danger. As a general rule,
one's knowledge and appreciation of a dangerous condition or defect
are to be measured subjectively: They are to be determined by that
particular person's actual conscious knowledge. 3 4 Hence, in the
greater majority of cases "[w]hether an injured person actually
'35
knew of the danger is peculiarly within the province of the jury.
There are, however, certain situations in which the plaintiff may be
charged with knowledge and appreciation as a matter of law.3 8 These
29. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex. 1974).
30. See Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975); Shamrock Fuel &
Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 406 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966), afi'd, 416
S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967); Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Murphy, 271 S.W.2d 672, 677-78 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1954, no writ).
31. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977); Rourke v.
Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 90
(Tex. 1974); Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, no writ). See also Polelle, The ForeseeabilityConcept and Strict Products Liability: The Odd Couple in Tort Law, 8 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 101, 129 (1976).
32. Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975).
33. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977); Rourke v.
Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 91
(Tex. 1974); see note 17 supra.
34. Massman-Johnson v. Gundolf, 484 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. 1972); Heil Co. v. Grant,
534 S.W.2d 916, 920-21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS, § 496D, comment c at 575 (1965).
35. Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 921 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
accord, Hillman-Kelley v. Pittman, 489 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, no
writ).
36. E.g., Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 549 S.W.2d 453, 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977,
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situations constitute an exception to the general rule and are severely limited. The case of Heil Co. v. Grant37 is one such example.
In that case, the court held that an injured person may be charged
objectively with knowledge of the danger where it was difficult or
impossible to determine his state of mind. 8
To date, the imposition of constructive knowledge has been limited to latent defects. The Texas Supreme Court held in Henderson
v. Ford Motor Co. : "No decision has been made by this court to
rule the case where the defendant manufacturer should have anticipated that the dangerous design would cause physical harm...
notwithstanding the plaintiff user's knowledge of the danger."" The
Henderson court did, however, cite authority from other jurisdictions which have refused to implement a volenti defense where the
circumstances indicated that the product was obviously dangerous.

41

There are several policy considerations which discourage the application of the volenti defense in a case involving patent defects.
First, the courts of this state have determined that assumption of
the risk is a harsh defense that places a great burden on the plaintiff.4" The extension of volenti to patent defects would allow an
absolute bar to recovery irrespective of the extent to which the user's
action contributed to the injury. A second and perhaps more important consideration is that the extension of volenti would defeat the
fundamental purpose of the theory behind products liability: the
creation of an incentive for manufacturers to produce safer prodno writ); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 921 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
37. 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
38. Id. at 921. The Heil case involved a fatal injury.
39. 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
40. Id. at 91. It has been suggested that Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975),
applied constructive knowledge and appreciation to a patent defect case. Sales & Perdue, The
Law of Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REv. 1, 76 (1977). The court in Rourke was
not, however, faced with a patent defect. The evidence did not establish that Rourke was
aware of the defect, nor did the evidence establishthat the defendant manufacturer should
have appreciated that the dangerous design would cause physical harm. This is apparent by
the jury's refusal to find the manufacturer guilty of negligence. The defect in Rourke was
latent whether viewed from the user's or manufacturer's standpoint. Rourke v. Garza, 530
S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975).
41. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex. 1974).
42. E.g., Rabb v. Coleman, 469 S.W.2d 384, 388 (Tex. 1971)(dissenting opinion); Ellis
v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 789, 794 (Tex. 1966); Azores v. Samson, 434 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1968, no writ).
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ucts.4 :1Thus, to allow a manufacturer to defend his suit on the basis
of having marketed an obviously defective product would be to reject the very policy considerations that gave birth to the law of
products liability. The manufacturer of an obviously defective product ought not escape because its product's defect was obvious. The
law should discourage misdesign and misconstruction rather than
encourage it in its obvious form.44 Finally, the implementation of the
open and obvious doctrine as a defense in products liability would
create a hiatus in the law. In the past the position-of almost every
manufacturer has been that his product was not defective. Under
the open and obvious doctrine, the manufacturer would have to
elect whether to defend its product as being totally without defect,
or prove that its product was so unsafe as to be obviously defective.4"
Because assumption of the risk is an affirmative defense, the burden
would thus be on the manufacturer to develop evidence that his
product was defective and that the danger was so open and obvious
that the plaintiff ought to be charged with knowledge and appreciation as a matter of law. It is suggested that the dangers inherent in
this type of defense are indeed open and obvious. The policy considerations thus overwhelmingly favor not expanding the application
of the volenti defense.
Voluntary Encounter. The final element of assumption of the risk
that the defendant must prove is that the plaintiff voluntarily encountered the risk or danger through exercise of a "free and intelligent choice." 4 Texas has departed from the Restatement position
in that the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct in this state
does not per se void the defense of assumption of the risk as the
Restatement suggests.47 Largely because there has been little case
43. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 849 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 913 (1968); Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 360 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
44. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 576-77, 364 N.Y.S.2d 115, 120-21 (1976);
Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 305 N.E.2d 769, 773, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 650-51 (1973), cited in
Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex. 1974); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson,
Inc., 476 P.2d 713, 719 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
45. The alternative would be to argue at the outset that there was no defect and later
attempt to convince the trier of the facts that the once non-existent defect had become open
and obvious.
46. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex. 1974); accord, Messick v.
General Motors Corp., 460 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1972); Otto v. Bobo, 287 S.W.2d 274, 279
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
47. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex. 1974).
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law in this area, the scope of voluntariness has yet to be adequately
defined. It has been established, however, that a free and intelligent
choice means a free choice of alternatives, not a choice between two
evils that are wrongfully imposed upon the user.4" Further, the encounter with a risk would not be voluntary where the plaintiff is
exercising a right or is responding to an emergency. 9
The definition of voluntariness which the courts have adopted
raises a bona fide question with respect to economic duress. If one
is under an economic compulsion, it may be argued that he cannot
truly exercise a "free and intelligent choice" in encountering the
danger. Clearly, the old negligence cases indicate that economic
compulsion will not excuse the plaintiff's action. 0 Nevertheless,
those cases sound in negligence and are based on the duty of a
landowner;" they do not address the policy considerations of products liability. Moreover, it has been held that there is a distinction
in the duties owed by a landowner and the duties owed by a supplier
of products: "[A] supplier of products . . . has a more stringent
duty." 52 Bearing this in mind and considering that a manufacturer
may not wrongfully impose upon a user a choice between two evils,
it appears that a manufacturer may not force a user to choose between encountering a danger and losing his livelihood. At least two
jurisdictions have so held."3 In the words of the Illinois Court of
Appeals, "[iun situations where the nature of plaintiff's employment requires exposure to certain hazards, it would be a non
sequiturof the policy considerations of strict tort liability to say that
plaintiff has voluntarily. . . assumed such hazards by mere acceptance of his employment."54 This would appear to be compatible with
the holding of the Texas Supreme Court that the lessor of premises
may not force the lessee into a "take it or leave it" position. 55 In the
final analysis, it is difficult to imagine that the "free and intelli48. Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255, 260 (Tex. 1974).
49. Harvey v. Seale, 362 S.W.2d 310, 313 (Tex. 1962).
50. McKee v. Patterson, 153 Tex. 517, 524-25, 271 S.W.2d 391, 396 (1954); Rittenberry
v. McKee, 337 S.W.2d 197, 201-02 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1960, writ refd n.r.e.); Bonn v.
Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry., 82 S.W.2d 808, 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, no writ).
51. Cases cited note 50 supra.
52. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. 1975).
53. Scott v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 326 N.E.2d 74, 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); see Codling
v. Paglia, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
54. Scott v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 326 N.E.2d 74, 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
55. Harvey v. Seale, 362 S.W.2d 310, 313 (Tex. 1962); cf. Crowell v. Housing Auth., 495
S.W.2d 887, 888-89 (Tex. 1973).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

9

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 9 [2022], No. 2, Art. 4

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:261

gent" choice envisioned by the supreme court is one that allows the
manufacturer to force the user to choose between two evils, especially when one of the choices is so grave as to cause the loss of
employment.
STATE OF THE ART

As

A DEFENSE IN TEXAS

Under the negligence theory of recovery, a product is evaluated
in terms of the knowledge and practices reasonably available in the
industry, known as the "state of the art." Professors Harper and
James, in their treatise on the law of torts, have written that, "[a]
person who undertakes to manufacture an instrumentality for use
by others will be held to an expert's knowledge of the arts, materials,
and processes relating to the product.""6 Nevertheless, liability will
not ensue unless the negligence is a proximate cause of the injury
alleged." The liability of the manufacturer, therefore, is limited by
what is reasonably foreseeable.58 Hence, in negligence, the product
is measured against what was reasonably foreseeable at the time of
59
manufacture.
In strict liability, however, the plaintiff need only establish that
the defect in the product was a producing cause of the damage
sustained."" Under the producing cause standard the concept of foreseeability has been eliminated. Thus, in strict liability actions, the
Texas Supreme Court has determined that the defect should be
measured at the time of trial.6' In strict liability then, the manufacturer is held to a much higher standard. It is no defense to strict
liability that the product was made in accordance with the best
available practices in the industry at the time of production. In fact,
the entire framework within which liability is measured has been
greatly restructured. Along with the elimination of the concept of
fault has come the minimization of the relevance of the practices
and customs within a given industry. Strict liability looks to the
56. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.4, at 1541 (1956).
57. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 352 n.4 (Tex. 1977); accord, O.S.
Stapley Co. v. Miller, 447 P.2d 248, 252 (Ariz. 1968); Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 355 N.E.2d
145, 152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
58. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351-52 (Tex. 1977).
59. Id. at 349.
60. Id. at 351. There is at least an argument that failure to warn of an abnormal reaction
to an otherwise safe drug may present an exception to this rule. The court in Crocker v.
Winthrop Laboratories, 514 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. 1974), held that the duty to warn an
idiosyncratic user does not arise until the risk of harm to a user becomes foreseeable.
61. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977).
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product not the manufacturer. Therefore, the only relevant question
centers upon whether the product is unreasonably dangerous at the
time of trial. Clearly, "state of the art" at the time of production
has no role in such a system.
MISUSE-THE NEW COMPARATIVE LIABILITY

Of all the products liability defenses, perhaps misuse has been the
most nebulous. One of the primary problems was that of determining the scope of misuse. Some have suggested that misuse is little
more than a guise for contributory negligence, 2 its purpose being to
bar recovery to a user who negligently misuses a product. Additionally, there existed a general uncertainty with respect to the question

of causation where misuse was a concurrent cause of the damages
incurred. These issues were presented to the Texas Supreme Court
in General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins. 3
In addressing the scope of misuse in Hopkins, the supreme court
determined that misuse is an abnormal use of a product: a use so

abnormal that it can not be reasonably anticipated by the seller. 4
Hence, the court rejected misuse as a defense "where the product
is dangerous for its foreseeable use and that danger is a producing
cause of the injury of a bystander or a user who has not himself
made some unforeseeable use of the product." 5 Thus, misuse is not
a defense where the misuse could have been anticipated by the
supplier, nor will misuse limit recovery in a situation in which the
user could not foresee the consequences of his misuse." The court
stated that, "[i]t is essential that the supplier prove, as an element
of this defense, that the consumer plaintiff should have reasonably
anticipated as consequences of the misuse that the malfunction or
injury, or some similar malfunction or injury, would occur."67 In
essence, to amount to misuse, the plaintiff's conduct must be a
proximate cause of the malfunction or injury."

62. Kronzer & Nichols, "No Duty" and "Volenti Non Fit Injuria"-Are the Ghosts
Really Laid?, 2 TEX. TRIAL LAW. F. 16 (1976).
63. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). For a discussion of the Hopkins decision see Scarzafava,
The Supreme Court of Texas Clarifies the Applicable Defenses in ProductsLiability, 40 TEx.
B.J. 733 (1977).
64. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex. 1977).
65. Id. at 351.
66. Id. at 351, 352.
67. Id. at 351.
68. Id. at 351.
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Finally, the Hopkins court addressed the viability of misuse
where: (1) the misuse was unforeseeable by the supplier, (2) the user
could have appreciated the consequences of his misuse, and (3) the
misuse was a concurrent cause of the malfunction or injury sustained." The court held that under these circumstances, the percentage of causation attributable to the plaintiff as a result of his misuse is to be compared with that percentage attributable to the defect in the product. After these proportions have been established,
the court is to award the plaintiff the percentage of his damages
caused by the defect in the product. As the supreme court noted,
the result is a pure comparative liability rather than the modified
comparative liability embodied in the Texas Comparative Negligence Statute. 0 The court justified its position in Hopkins with the
assertion that "the supplier should not be required to pay for all of
the damages suffered by a user who contributes to the cause of his
harm by unforeseeable handling of the product." 7 In the final analysis, the defense of misuse has been greatly restricted. In cases
where this defense remains applicable, it limits the plaintiff's recovery only to the extent that his misuse contributes to the cause of his
harm .72
PERSPECTIVE-TOWARD A PURE COMPARATIVE LIABILITY?

In the aftermath of Hopkins there has been much speculation
concerning the possibility of a general restructuring of products liability defenses. There can be little question that some mode of uniform system must be established, as products liability defenses in
Texas are, at present, in a state of chaos. Assumption of the risk,
as previously stated, is an absolute defense in actions predicated on
strict liability, but no defense to products liability cases brought
under the negligence theory. Misuse, also a strict liability defense,
is, however, a partial defense in that area, with recovery limited by
the extent to which the plaintiff contributed to the cause of the
damaging event. Misuse has no application in cases predicated on
negligence. Finally, comparative negligence is at least a partial defense in negligence suits, and may be a complete bar if the plaintiffs
negligence caused more than fifty percent of his injury. This strange
69. Id. at 352.
70. Id. at 352.
71. Id. at 351.
72. Id. at 352.
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interplay among the various defenses defies logical analysis. Recovery oftentimes will depend more upon the form of pleading, negligence or strict liability, rather than upon the merits of the case.7"
Even within strict liability itself, however, it is possible that a plaintiff, with a minimal contribution on his part, will be denied recovery
absolutely because of assumption of the risk. At the same time, a
more active contributor will recover where the defense is misuse.
Many scholars have contended that the answer to this anomaly
is a pure comparative liability or pure comparative causation standard, which would be applied in all situations.7 4 Such a development certainly would result in uniformity irrespective of the pleading or defense raised. In fact, pure comparative liability has already
been successfully applied in some jurisdictions.7 5
The problem, however, may not be as easily resolved in Texas.
Two of the defenses in Texas, assumption of the risk and misuse,
are judicial in origin. Comparative negligence, on the other hand,
is statutory. Thus, the adoption of pure comparative liability in this
state must be accomplished, at least in part, by the legislature.
Even should the Texas Supreme Court decide to apply this liability
concept to assumption of the risk, legislative enactment would be
necessary to change the standard established for comparative negligence."
At present, products liability law is a conglomeration of negligence, strict liability, and to some extent warranty law. Before there
can be any meaningful clarification of the applicable defenses, the
transition to strict liability must be fully accomplished. Products
liability cases should sound in strict liability only. Once this has
been accomplished, the courts will be free to apply pure comparative liability to the assumption of the risk defense and thus achieve
a long sought uniformity. Until such time, the practitioner must be
ever cognizant of the idiosyncrasies in the law as they exist in the
aftermath of Hopkins.
73. See Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 36
(1973).
74. E.g., Sales & Perdue, The Law of Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. Rlv. 1,
66-70 (1977); Woods, The New Kansas ComparativeNegligence Act-An Idea Whose Time
Has Come, 14 WASH. L.J. 1, 24-26 (1975).
75. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 43 (Alaska 1976);
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280
So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973).
76. In a negligence case the plaintiff's recovery would be totally barred where his negligence exceeded fifty percent. TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Supp. 1976-1977).
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